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Abstract
Theoretical arguments for using a term structure of social discount rates (SDR)
that declines with the time horizon have inuenced Government guidelines in
the US and Europe. The certainty equivalent discount rate that often underpins
this guidance embodies uncertainty in the primitives of the SDR, such as growth.
For distant time horizons the probability distributions of these primitives are
ambiguous and the certainty equivalent itself is uncertain. Yet, if a limited set
of characteristics of the unknown probability distributions can be agreed upon,
sharpupper and lower bounds can be dened for the certainty-equivalent SDR.
Unfortunately, even with considerable agreement on these features, these bounds
are widely spread for horizons beyond 75 years. So while estimates of the present
value of intergenerational impacts, including the social cost of carbon, can be
bounded in the presence of this ambiguity, they typically remain so imprecise as
to provide little practical guidance.
Key Words Declining discount rates, Distribution uncertainty, Social Cost of Carbon.
JEL classication H43, Q51.
1 Introduction
The outcome of cost-benet analysis of public projects with intergenerational consequences
is notoriously sensitive to the social discount rate (SDR) employed. Small variations in
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assumptions about the appropriate SDR can therefore lead to very di¤erent policy recom-
mendations for the preservation of natural resources and environmental quality, including
the retention of biodiversity (Freeman and Groom (2013)) and the case for mitigating against
greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Nordhaus (2007), Stern (2008)).
This policy-sensitivity is particularly problematic because the primitives that underlie
the long-term discount rate are di¢ cult to determine. For example, the growth rate of
aggregate consumption and the rate of return to capital over the next four centuries are
essentially unknown today, since they depend on a number of unpredictable events including
technological advances, political and social unrest, environmental change and even pandemics
(e.g. Almond (2006)).
A typical way to approach long-term discounting is to calculate a certainty equivalent
social discount rate, a single rate which embodies uncertainty in the SDR primitives. Yet
even though uncertainty is taken into account, such calculations assume a fanciful level of
predictive power, since they assume perfect knowledge of the relevant probability distri-
butions. In the context of intergenerational decision-making, the probabilities associated
with di¤erent future states of the world are thought to be ambiguous at best, and at worst
unknown.2 Consequently, the certainty equivalent discount rate is itself uncertain.
In this paper we make a contribution to the literature on social discounting under uncer-
tainty by calculating empirical sharpupper and lower bounds for the certainty-equivalent
social discount rate when we have imperfect knowledge of probability distributions of SDR
primitives. Such bounds can be calculated if decision-makers are willing to assume partial,
but not complete, agreement on some characteristics of these distributions. The existence of
sharp bounds is the good news. The bad news is that these bounds are typically very wide
and fail to provide precise calculations of present values.
These ndings are important because the burgeoning literature on the term structure of
2We use the term ambiguous in this paper in the sense of (Klibano¤ et al. 2011, p.400) that this
denition is characterized by, roughly, disagreement in the probability assigned to an event by the various
probability measures that are subjectively relevant.
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social discount rates, expertly reviewed by Gollier (2012) and Arrow et al. (2014), has been
highly inuential at a policy level. The message coming from these contributions is that, for
risk free projects, the term structure should be declining with the time horizon. This view
is exemplied by a recent Policy Forum article in Science, in which it is argued that where
we are uncertain about the future there are compelling arguments for using a declining
discount rate schedule(Arrow et al. 2013, p. 350). As a consequence of these theoretical
advances, declining discount rates (DDRs) can now be found in government guidelines in
the UK and France, inuence recommendations in the US (Cropper et al. (2014)), and lie
behind recent advice given to the Norwegian, Danish and Dutch governments. In the UK,
DDRs have been used in the governmental economic analysis of the High Speed 2 (HS2) rail
link and for capital budgeting purposes by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. DDRs
have already had policy impact.
The DDRs that appear in government guidelines are typically based on certainty-equivalent
discount rates which reect uncertainty in the future or disagreement among experts on the
appropriate discount rate, perhaps for ethical reasons. An inuential set of arguments sup-
poses that for some x, the di¤erent denitions of which are reviewed in subsequent sections,
the present value, pH ; of a certain $1 arriving at time H is given by pH = E [exp ( Hx)].
The H period certainty-equivalent discount rate, RH , is then dened through the relation-
ship exp( HRH) = pH . Exponential functions are convex, and so, by Jensens inequality,
E [exp ( Hx)]  exp ( HE [x]): uncertainty over x raises the present value, pH , and lowers
the discount rate, RH . The magnitude of this e¤ect becomes greater the more uncertain
we are about x, and the more convex the exponential function, the latter being determined
by the parameter value H. As a consequence RH declines with the time horizon until in
the limit, as H !1, it approaches the lowest possible outcome for x.3
3A numerical example illustrates the mechanics of the result. Suppose that, with equal probability, x will
either take the value of 2% or 6%. The social value of $1 delivered at time H with certainty is then given by
the expected present value under these two outcomes, pH = 0:5 (exp ( 0:02H) + exp ( 0:06H)), resulting
in R1 = 3:98%, R50 = 3:13%, R100 = 2:67% and R400 = 2:17%. The x = 6% outcome is, through the power
of exponential discounting, given increasingly less voice in the social valuation pH as H gets larger. For
horizons of a century or more, to good approximation, its contribution to pH becomes so small that it can
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While this may seem like a narrowly-dened structure, it has several di¤erent interpre-
tations depending on the approach taken to social discounting and DDRs. Its most famous
use stems from Weitzmans (2001) Gamma Discountingpaper. Here, x was interpreted as
reecting di¤erent expert opinions on the value of the discount rate itself. In this context,
the justication for using the formula pH = E [exp ( Hx)] remains controversial. This is
partly because its connection with utility theory was not made clear at the time, and partly
that more recent theoretical motivations rely on quite restrictive assumptions. We discuss
this point in detail in Sections 2 and 3. Less well known is that x can also be interpreted
through the Social Rate of Time Preference (SRTP) in a more standard consumption-based
Ramsey asset pricing framework. A proof of this proposition is given in Section 3. A third
interpretation of x, also discussed in Section 3, is that it represents the average return to
risk-free capital over the horizon of the cash ow. Since they all have a similar expecta-
tions structure, the methods that we describe for deriving the sharp bounds for the certainty
equivalent discount rate can be equally well applied to any of these interpretations.
Putting any of these interpretations into practice requires assumptions about the uncer-
tainty surrounding the primitives of the SDR that are contained in x, through its probability
density function (pdf), f (x) : The main approach taken so far is to parameterize f (x) and
treat this distribution as if it is perfectly identied. Yet, because our knowledge of the future
is nowhere near as precise as this approach would suggest, a more realistic starting point
would be to admit that we do not, perhaps cannot, know the true nature of f (x) over time
horizons of many decades or centuries. For very long-term decisions the context is one of
uncertainty and ambiguity. We are not alone in thinking this. Pindyck (2015) recently made
a similar point in relation to social discounting, while Iverson (2013) and Traeger (2014) both
take ambiguity as their starting points. Yet the approach that we take assumes far more
knowledge about the future than Knight (1921), who would maintain that true uncertainty
is immeasurable. To reduce the problem we imagine a situation where the social planner
be ignored altogether with pH  0:5 exp ( 0:02H) and RH  0:02  ln (0:5) =H. In the limit, as H  !1,
RH ! 2%.
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gathers a panel of economists who, while accepting that it will be impossible to agree on the
precise distribution of x, are nonetheless tasked with identifying the set of density functions
such that all members agree that f (x) is a member of this set.4 Agreement in this context
takes the form of agreeing characteristics shared by all distributions within a set. For in-
stance, the set may contain probability distributions which share the same rst K moments,
or alternatively the same values for particular quantiles.5 They might, instead, be members
of a family of distributions, such as the gamma or Wald (Inverse Gaussian) distribution. Of
course, the number of pdfs which share the basic information that denes the set is innite,
and so there is signicant room left for disagreement. Yet, as we show, given some level of
agreement on shared characteristics, the social planner can determine the highest and lowest
certainty equivalent social discount rate that is consistent with the agreed set of pdfs, for
each horizon H. In contrast to Iverson (2013) and Traeger (2014), therefore, our focus is on
proving a range of potential values for RH which the social planner cannot easily dismiss,
rather than determining a single precise schedule of discount rates for an ambiguity averse
decision maker.
Our central conclusion is that, despite limiting the ambiguity over the future by requiring
signicant agreement on some characteristics of f (x), the range of values that RH might
reasonably take remains extremely wide for horizons of three-quarters of a century or more
irrespective of the theoretical interpretation of x. This result is primarily driven by uncer-
tainty over the properties of the extreme left-hand tail of f (x) even when there is widespread
consensus on other characteristics of the distribution. While clearly distinct, this nding
echoes the substantial existing literature explaining the key role played by extreme outcomes
in the economics of climate change.6
4While it is possible that these assumptions will be falsied with the benet of hindsight, we assume that
the social planner is willing to make decisions on the basis of assumptions about f (x) that are su¢ ciently
uncontroversial for reasonable people to be able to agree upon them today. OHagan et al. (2006) provides
a detailed review of how expertsprobability judgements might be assessed for this purpose.
5To avoid issues around innities, as famously discussed in a related context through the dismal theorem
of Weitzman (2009), we assume throughout that the rst K moments of f (x) are nite and that, more
generally, its moment generating function is dened.
6See, for example, papers published by Professors Weitzman, Nordhaus and Pindyck summarizing a
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Three policy applications are then presented in which the present values of long-term cash
ow schedules are calculated: (i) the damages caused by carbon emissions; (ii) the estimated
benets of Phase 1 of the HS2 rail link; and (iii) the costs of decommissioning the previous
generation of nuclear power stations within the UK. As is to be expected, the less we agree
upon about the future, the wider are the bounds of the certainty equivalent discount rate
and the more uncertain we are about the truepresent value. For example, using gamma
discounting (Weitzman (2001)) as our underlying DDR model, even if there is agreement on
the rst four moments of f (x), then the social cost of carbon (SCC) can lie anywhere within
the interval $13.6 per ton of carbon (/tC) and $46.1/tC. This is a sobering result when one
considers that even agreement on the rst moment is likely to be an optimistic assumption.
In this latter position of relative ignorance, the SCC can be anywhere between $5/tC and
$190/tC.
The obvious conclusion for policy, therefore, is that social planners should be extremely
cautious when making decisions on intergenerational matters based on calculating Net Present
Values. Even if we make the bold claim that we know some minimal summary statistics of
the uncertainty surrounding future growth or interest rates, and ignore broader issues such
as true Knightian uncertainty, we can still only be sure that the appropriate discount rate
will lie within very wide bounds. In such cases spot estimates of, say, the SCC will give a
false impression of precision. So, while on the up-side our method provides a concrete way
in which to set the range for sensitivity analysis in cost-benet analysis, the broader message
is that additional decision-making criteria are likely to be required for long-term projects.
2 DDRs under gamma discounting
Consider a social planner who has decided to implement a schedule of declining discount rates
for calculating the present value of the certainty-equivalent cash ows that will arise from
symposium on Fat tails and the economics of climate changepublished in the Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy, 5(2), 2011.
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intergenerational investment projects. As discussed in the introduction such a policy can be
motivated by an H period certainty equivalent discount rate with the following structure:
RH =  H 1 ln (E [exp ( Hx)]) (1)
for some x whose probability or frequency distribution, f (x) ; might be H dependent.
While the next section will go into detail about the theoretical justications for this structure
and the di¤erent associated interpretations of x, at this point it is helpful to briey mention
the main interpretations of x that appear in the literature. In one strand, x is interpreted
as the average long-term risk-free rate of interest, for another it is the Social Rate of Time
Preference (SRTP) from the standard Ramsey model, SRTP = + g, where  is the pure
rate of time preference,  is the elasticity of marginal utility; and g is the real growth of
per capita consumption. Given these di¤erent possibilities, the data on x could be elicited
from survey responses, as in Weitzman (2001) and Drupp et al. (2015). Alternatively it
might be derived from revealed preference, such as in Groom and Maddison (2013) for .
The data could reect normative views for  and  or could represent forecasts of market
interest rates and growth, perhaps based on historical data. Consequently, the expectations
operator, E [], can act either (as usual) as a probability weighted aggregator of the possible
future realizations of a stochastic random variable, or as a weighted average across di¤erent
opinions or characteristics. In the broader literature these distinct sources of data determine
the way in which the expectation in equation 1 is calculated (Freeman and Groom (2015)).
In this section we view equation 1 through the lens of the gamma discountingframework
of Weitzman (2001). Here, x represents di¤erent expert opinions on the discount rate and
f (x) is the frequency distribution of those opinions. This framework is selected to explain
our main point not because we believe that it is necessarily the best for determining the
schedule of social discount rates, but instead because of its simplicity. This choice allows us
to make our central point with minimal extraneous complexity before we extend the analysis
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to other interpretations of equation 1 and x in Sections 3 and 4.
Gamma discounting used a survey of N = 2160 PhD level economists who were asked the
question Taking all relevant considerations into account, what real interest rate do you think
should be used to discount over time the (expected) benets and (expected) costs of projects
being proposed to mitigate the possible e¤ects of global climate change?. Weitzman (2001)
then argued that the social value, pH , of $1 that will arrive at time H with certainty should
be determined by an average of the individual discount factors. If the response of expert i
is denoted by xi, the SDR is given by:
RH =   1
H
ln
 
NX
i=1
wi exp ( Hxi)
!
(2)
where wi is the weight placed on expert i by the social planner.7
Rather than applying this framework directly, Professor Weitzman instead noticed that
the sample frequency distribution of responses was approximately gamma distributed,   (; ),
for rate parameter  and shape parameter . Under this approximation, if equal weight is
given to each expert, wi = 1=N for all i, equation 2 becomes:
RH =   1
H
ln
Z 1
0
e Hx

  ()
x 1e xdx

=

H
ln

1 +
H


(3)
This gives a convenient closed-form solution for the term structure of the social discount rate
that depends only on the two parameters of the gamma distribution. For the purposes of
this paper, gamma discountingis dened as determining the SDR through equation 3.
Now assume that the social planner has decided to use equation 2 to determine the
SDR, and then chosen to calibrate this equation using Weitzmans survey data.8 However,
7A similar approach can also be applied when a social planner is constructing a global discount rate that
reects the potentially conicting positions of di¤erent social groups or geographical regions. Similar to
the case of expert opinion, f (x) represents the weighted population frequency distribution of the di¤erent
discount rates that would be applied by either a specic sub-group of society or international governments.
See, for example, (Gollier 2012, Chapter 9).
8We delay discussion of the theoretical arguments for and against using equation 2 to the next section.
Choosing to calibrate with Weitzmans data is also controversial. Dasgupta (2008), for example, argues
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she has serious reservations about applying equation 3 because she remains unconvinced
that setting wi = 1=N is a natural choice. Her views here are inuenced by Gollier and
Zeckhauser (2005), Jouini et al. (2010), Heal and Millner (2014), Jouini and Napp (2014)
and Freeman and Groom (2015), all of whom argue that experts should only be weighted
equally under very restrictive assumptions  we will return to this issue in the next section.
To seek further guidance, she brings together a panel of J economists to reach consensus
on which properties of wi, and hence f (x) are su¢ ciently uncontroversial so as to provide
a solid ground for policy decisions. The panel quickly agrees that all experts should be
given non-negative weight, wi  0 for all i, and that the weights should sum to one. These
choices ensure that equation 2 can be interpreted within the context of equation 1 when, for
mathematical convenience, each xi is treated as if it were a possible realization of a random
variable that has probability wi of occurring. In this context f (x) has the interpretation of
being a weighted sample frequency distribution.
Unfortunately, being economists, panel members fail to agree on the choice of weightings,
wi, so each of them proposes their own weighted distribution, fj (x) for j 2 [1; J ]; to the
social planner. Disagreement in this case could reect variations in the way that each panel
member perceives the professional standing of each expert. Alternatively it might be that
panel members have di¤erent preferences for the specic approaches to social discounting
that are advocated by di¤erent groups of the sampled population.9 Finally, the proposed
fj (x) could reect the panel members position on how independent the expert opinions are
from one another (Freeman and Groom (2015)). Deciding on these weights is ultimately a
subjective professional choice, and there is no strong reason for the social planner to believe
that the values selected by one panel member are in any sense better than those of another.
Therefore, in a spirit of open-mindedness, she views all panel membersweighting choices
that a more democratic approach should be taken to social discounting than just canvassing the opinions
of experts. Furthermore, a recent survey by Drupp et al. (2015) reports a very di¤erent spread of expert
views on the SDR to Weitzman (2001).
9Drupp et al. (2015) provides a lengthy discussion of the underlying reasons why experts give conicting
advice on RH , and presents detailed evidence concerning the spread of opinions on each of these matters.
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as equally plausible, and will not look to further aggregate these conicting opinions into a
single discount rate schedule.
In order to provide useful input to policy further consensus is needed to stop cases of
extreme disagreement.10 Specically, the social planner asks that weights are chosen to
ensure that certain statistical properties of fj (x) are the same across all panel members,
j. While not exhaustive, these might relate to agreeing on some combination of: (i) the
support of f (x), [a; b], which corresponds to the lowest and highest expert opinions that can
be given non-zero weight; (ii) the moments of f (x); (iii) the quantiles of f (x); and/or (iv)
whether a specic family of distributions can be used to describe f (x). In this set-up, our
central question becomes: given agreement between panel members on some, but not all, of
the properties of f (x), what are the maximum and minimum values that RH can take that
are consistent with this level of agreement? Following on from this, has the panel reached
su¢ cient consensus so that the remaining disagreement over RH does not matterfrom a
policy perspective? These questions are answered in the following subsections.
2.1 Agreement on the moments of x
Initially, the panel are willing to accept that some features of the spread of weighted expert
opinions on the discount rate, f (x) ; can be derived from the   (; ) distribution that
approximates the equally-weighted sample frequency distribution of Weitzmans survey data.
The panel also agree that parameter values,  = 1:90 and  = 47:23, can be estimated using
a methods of moments approach. From this framework, agreement is reached that a = 0%,
the lower bound of the gamma distribution, and b = 19:11%, which is the 99.9th percentile
of the same distribution. While the raw survey data of Weitzman have responses below a
and above b; the panel reaches agreement that the extreme outliers lie su¢ ciently far from
the mean as to be given zero weight. Our results are much more sensitive to the choice of
the former than the latter as RH ! a as H !1. We return to this issue in Subsection 2.3.
10Such as one panel member placing all weight on the expert with the highest response and another placing
all weight on the one with the lowest response.
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The panel is also willing to estimate some or all of the mean, standard deviation, skewness,
and excess kurtosis of f (x) from this distribution. These values are respectively 4.03%,
2.92%, 1.45 and 3.15. However, this is the limit of the agreement that the panel members
can reach.
Suppose rst that the panel can only reach agreement that the mean of x =
P
iwixi
equals 4.03%, together with a and b. Then, at one extreme, one panel member might
wish to place all weight on the expert whose opinion matches the agreed mean value of
  (; ), 4.03%.11 This results in RH = 4:03% for all H. At the other extreme, another
panel member might think that the two most informed experts lie at the opposite far ends
of the support, a = 0% and b = 19:11% and chooses weights on each expert so as to
match the agreed mean. These weights turn out to be 78.9% and 21.1% respectively. In
this case, the social value is the weighted average of the expert discount factors; pH =
0:789 + 0:211 exp ( 0:1911H), resulting in R50 = 0:5% and R100 = 0:2%: Taking together
the views of the two panel members, for cash ows one century from now, the social planner
cannot discard the possibility that the appropriate discount rate might be as low as 0.2% or
as high as 4%.
Given this wide range of possible values for RH , the social planner asks the panel whether
they might also be willing to accept the estimate of the standard deviation of x from   (; ).
If so, the following two extreme distributions each meet this new consensus. For the rst,
the weighting is 96.4% at x = 3:47%, with the remaining 3.6% at b. For the second,
the weighting is 34.4% at a and 65.6% at 6.15%. Now R100 is equal to 3.5% for the rst
distribution and 1.1% for the second.
Again, the social planner feels that this does not provide a su¢ ciently narrow range to
make important policy choices, so now asks the panel to agree on the skewness as well. In
this case, R100 can lie in the range 1.3% to 2.7%. With kurtosis added, the range narrows
11While Weitzman (2001) reports integer values for xi, we assume that these round a continuum of
responses over [a; b]. Placing all weight on one response, the median (not the mean), has been proved
to be the optimal choice of SDR for a social planner who wishes to choose a democratic voting policy over
optimal consumption paths (Millner and Heal (2014)).
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further to 1.7% to 2.5%.12
The examples we have described of the extremes of disagreement that can persist over
the weights may seem arbitrary, but they are not. As shown by Karlin and Studden (1966),
in each case they represent the distributions which, while maintaining agreement on both the
support and K 2 [1; 4] moments of f (x), give the absolute upper and lower sharpbounds
of RH .13 A detailed discussion of this method is provided in Appendix A. The top graph
in Figure 1 shows these sharp bound values of RH for H 2 [1; 400] and K 2 [1; 4]:
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
For K  2, there is a wide potential range of RH for all but the shortest horizons. For
higher values of K, which correspond to greater levels of agreement amongst the panel, the
bounds remain relatively close together for approximately the rst 75 years. After that,
however, the di¤erences become clear, even for K = 4.
Our central point follows from Figure 1. The social planner has extracted very high levels
of agreement out of the panel of economists advising her, more than is perhaps realistic. The
panel must estimate the social discount rate using equation 2, agree that the highest and
lowest possible values of x are 0% and 19.11% respectively, and then further agree on several
moments of f (x). Yet, despite this fanciful level of consensus, the sharp bounds for RH
remain widely spread, particularly for long time horizons.
2.2 Agreement on the quantiles
Given the top graph in Figure 1, the social planner is dissatised with the levels of uncer-
tainty that remain over RH when discussions focus around the moments of the distribution.
12For skewness, the upper bound is given when the probability density function has mass of 79.3% and
20.7% at x = 2:54% and 9.76% respectively. The lower bound is given when the probability density function
has mass of 25.8%, 72.7% and 1.54% at x = a, 5:14% and b. When kurtosis is included the weights are
66.7%, 32.5% and 0.8% at x = 2:08%; 7.68% and b for the upper bound and 17.6%, 74.4% and 8.0% for
x = a; 4:08% and 12.45% for the lower bound.
13This relies on the observation that the set of functions
n
1; x; :::; xK ; ( 1)K+1 exp ( Hx)
o
for H > 0 and
positive integer K is a Tchebyche¤ system.
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She therefore returns to the panel of economists and asks instead that they consider the
quantiles of f (x), as well as its supports, a = 0% and b = 19:11%. This decision might be
motivated by the observation in (OHagan 2012, p.37) that The quantitative judgements
that are used in elicitation are almost invariably evaluations of probabilities. Although we
might ask the expert to assess quantities such as means and variances, the evidence from
the experimental literature is generally that these are evaluated less accurately than prob-
abilities... Moments are cognitively more complex constructs and highly sensitive to the
thickness of a distributions tails.
In the rst instance, she asks that the panel agrees on the terciles (Q = 3) of the distri-
bution. With the panel again basing their estimates of the quantiles on   (; ) estimated
using Weitzmans (2001) sample data, consensus is reached that weighting summing to 1/3
should be applied to expert opinions that lie within each of the following three ranges:
x < 2:35%, 2:35% < x < 4:61%, and x > 4:61%.
The sharp lower and upper bounds for RH contingent on this level of agreement are now
straightforward to derive. They respectively correspond to cases when all permissible weight
is placed at the lower and upper bounds of each quantile range. In the example to hand,
this is one-third weightings at a = 0%, 2.35% and 4.61% for the lower bound and the same
weighting at 2.35%, 4.61% and b = 19:11% for the upper bound. The social value is given
by the weighted average discount factor, so the bounds for pH at H =100 years are:
1 + exp( 2:35) + exp( 4:61)
3
> p100 >
exp( 2:35) + exp( 4:61) + exp( 19:11)
3
(4)
resulting in 1:00% < R100 < 3:35%.
The social planner again asks the panel to increase its level of agreement by raising the
value of Q to rst ve and then seven. In the former case, the top and bottom deciles are
included (1.02% and 7.93% for   (; )). For the latter, the rst and 99th percentiles are
also captured (0.27% and 13.67% for   (; )).14 When Q = 5; R100 2 [1:52%; 2:79%], while
14These quantile levels are chosen to match the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth As-
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when Q = 7; R100 2 [1:63%; 2:72%]. The bottom graph in Figure 1 plots the strict upper
and lower bounds for RH for Q 2 f3; 5; 7g and H 2 [1; 400].
In contrast to the top graph of Figure 1, for short time horizons, the bounds remain clearly
distinct. This is because agreement on quantiles does not necessarily lead to agreement on
the moments of the distribution. The individual f (x) that create the bounds have di¤erent
mean values. Since RH ! E [x] as H ! 0; this leads to wide bounds for short horizons.
Crucially though, the term structures remain widely separated for all horizons. This makes
it clear that while focussing on quantiles may be cognitively easier for the members of the
expert panel than focussing on the moments, it provides no decision-making advantage from
the perspective of the social planner.
2.3 Families of f (x)
In the analysis described so far, the sharp bounds for RH are derived from distributions that
place non-zero weight on only a very limited number of experts. The social planner may,
though, agree with Weitzman (2001) that all experts should be heard in the social discount
rate, and that setting wi = 1=N for all i is a sensible choice. However she still seeks guidance
from the panel on how f (x) should be estimated in this case.
One subset of the panel is willing to accept that f (x) is best described by a gamma
distribution, but would prefer that  and  are estimated through a maximum likelihood
method. Based on the strictly positive responses to Weitzmans survey, this gives  =2.54
and  =63.08. The implied mean and standard deviation of this distribution are 4.03% and
2.53% respectively, giving a lower spread than when the parameter values are estimated by
method of moments.
The second subset of the panel argue instead that Weitzmans data is better tted by a
Wald (Inverse Gaussian) distribution than a gamma distribution. This is also supported on
the interval [0;1) and is positively skewed, and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test weakly indicates
sessment Reports (IPCC AR5) probabilisitic denitions of the terms Virtually certain, Very likely,
Likely, About as likely as not, Unlikely, Very unlikelyand Exceptionally unlikely.
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that it ts Weitzmans survey data better than a gamma distribution. Based on a method
of moments approach, the distribution is calibrated with shape parameter  = 0:0767 and
mean  = 0:0403. Analogous to equation 3, from the moment generating function of this
distribution:
RH =   1
H
ln
 Z 1
0
e Hx
r

2x3
exp
 
  (x  )2
22x
!
dx
!
=

H
0@s1 + 22H

  1
1A (5)
Again, the term structure of discount rates can be simply derived in closed form based on
the two parameter values of the underlying distribution.
A third subgroup of the panel disagrees with both of these choices of distribution for f (x)
since they are supported on the positive real line. Selecting these distributions e¤ectively
places zero weight on the three respondents to Weitzmans survey who gave negative values,
the lowest of which was -3%, as well as the additional 46 who expressed their opinion that
the social discount rate should be zero. This subgroup of the panel argues that more
attention should be paid to the lower bound, a, particularly as Weitzman (1998) proves that
limH!1RH = a. They believe that f (x) is best approximated by the raw sample frequency
distribution of responses and that equation 2 should be applied directly to the data with
wi = 1=N for all i. The top graph in Figure 2 displays the cumulative distribution functions
for these di¤erent choices, and from this it is clear that they are highly similar and there is
no obvious a priori reason why the social planner should have a strong preference for one
over the others.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
The bottom graph in this gure presents the term structure of discount rates in each
case. For the gamma and Wald distributions, the term structures are closer together than
those shown in Figure 1. However, for long time horizons they are clearly distinct. Using
the sample frequency distribution leads to a very di¤erent term structure to any of the
others reported in this paper. Beyond 250 years, RH becomes negative, which implies
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that the social planner should compound the cash ows received after this horizon.15 This
illustrates the sensitivity of the analysis to the lower support, a, for f (x), since this is the
only distribution that is considered in this section that allows x to take negative values.
While clearly distinct, this analysis draws parallels with the literature that discusses
the role played by extreme events in the economics of climate change. In particular, when
explaining his dismal theorem, (Weitzman 2011, p.287) argues that if the probability density
function of the natural logarithm of disutility is upper fat-tailed, then the willingness to
pay (WTP) to avoid extreme climate changes (is) very large, indeed arbitrarily large if
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is bounded above one. In such cases it is vital to
understand the possible extremes of climate change damage, the worst case scenarios for
consumption, and the characteristics of utility in the event of an environmental disaster in
order to best inform policy. In our framework, there is no uncertainty over the damages
as the analysis is being undertaken on a certainty-equivalent basis, and, in this section, no
explicit consideration of consumption and utility. However, the wide bounds for RH that we
report at long horizons are largely driven by the di¤erent weights placed on the experts who
gave the lowest value responses to the gamma discounting survey. Forcing agreement on
the rst four moments, seven quantiles, or broad families of distribution does not su¢ ciently
constrain these weights to precisely dene the certainty equivalent discount rate. It is
uncertainty over the extreme left-hand tail of f (x) that is primarily driving the results in
this paper.
2.4 Impact on Net Present Values
Having determined a range of possible paths for declining discount rates based on gamma
discounting, we now turn to how sensitive intergenerational valuations are to the schedule
chosen. Table 1 reports the present value of $1 million that is to be received with certainty
15From equation 2, RH <  H 1 ln (exp(0:03H)=2160), where the right-hand side represents the contri-
bution of the single expert who gave a response of -3% for the social discount rate. The right-hand side is
negative if H > ln(2160)=0:03 = 256. This corresponds closely to the point where RH crosses the x axis
in the bottom graph of Figure 2. One expert alone, therefore, explains a key characteristic of this gure.
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in either 100, 200 or 400 years under each di¤erent scenario.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Panel A presents each valuation under the baseline model. Panels B and C show that,
as is to be expected, the range that pH can take becomes more widely spread the longer the
time horizon, H, and the less the level of agreement, K or Q, that is reached by the panel of
economists. Even at 100 years, and with the greatest levels of agreement considered, there is
more than a twofold di¤erence between the highest and lowest valuation whether discussion
focusses on moments or quantiles. For horizons of four centuries, there is a potential order
of magnitude di¤erence in valuation when Q = 7, and two orders of magnitude di¤erence
when K = 4. This illustrates the sensitivity of cost-benet analysis to small di¤erences in
the choice of assumptions about the primitives of the discounting problem.
Panel D of Table 1 considers instead di¤erent families of distributions for f (x). Com-
pared to Panels B and C, at H = 100 years, valuations are relatively insensitive to the choice
made. However, at H = 200 years, the valuation under the Wald distribution is less than
half that of the baseline model, with the raw sample frequency distribution giving a valuation
that is an order of magnitude larger. At 400 years, the di¤erences are stark. Of particular
note, as the discount rate for the sample frequency distribution is negative for such long time
horizons, the $1 million gets compounded under this model to a present value of $76.8m.
By contrast, the Wald distribution values the same cash ow at only two thousand dollars.
Table 2 is similar to Table 1, but now for the social cost of carbon (SCC) in US dollars
per ton of carbon ($/tC) calculated using each of the term structures reported in Figures
1 and 2, and based on the schedule of marginal carbon damages provided by Newell and
Pizer (2003). These cash ows have a horizon of 400 years, with 50% of the undiscounted
costs arising by year 170. This table also reports the present values calculated for an
infrastructure project; the o¢ cial estimates of benets from Phase 1 of the HS2 rail link
(London to Birmingham) that is currently being planned in the UK. The cash ows are
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taken directly from the HS2 o¢ cial website. These arise over a 75 year period to 2085, with
50% of the undiscounted benets occurring by year 53. Finally, the table gives the present
values of the estimated costs of decommissioning nineteen nuclear power stations in the UK
as given in the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) report and account 2012/13.
While these span over a longer time horizon than HS2 (125 years), the half-lifeis shorter,
with 50% of the undiscounted costs occurring by year 29. Further details on these cash ow
estimates are described in the technical online appendices of Freeman and Groom (2015).
[Insert Table 2 around here]
As the damages caused by greenhouse gas emissions are spread over such long time hori-
zons, it is perhaps unsurprising that the estimated SCC is highly sensitive to the schedule of
RH that is deployed. For the greatest considered level of agreements over both moments and
quantiles, K = 4 and Q = 7, the maximum value is three times the minimum value. When
there is agreement over either two moments or three quantiles, the di¤erence is more than
ten-fold. Even when f (x) is restricted to come from either a Wald or gamma distribution
with parameters estimated through a method of moments approach, the latter valuation is
more than 35% greater than the former. The sample frequency distribution gives the highest
valuation at almost $1,000/tC.
As a consequence of the shorter time periods covered by the HS2 rail link and nuclear
decommissioning, the potential range of valuations are narrower in these cases than for the
SCC. When consensus is on the quantiles, the bounds for RH are widely spread even for
low H; see Figure 2. Given this, more precise valuations can be given for these examples
when discussion is focussed around the moments instead. Agreement on the distributional
family reduces the range of possible values even further, even when the sample frequency
distribution is included as a viable characterization of f (x).
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3 The theoretical basis for DDRs
In the previous section, equation 1 was viewed through the lens of gamma discounting so as
to make our central point as simply as possible. In this section we explain the theoretical
underpinnings of this approach and some of the criticisms that have been raised in relation
to it. We then show that other more conventional theoretical frameworks have the same
structure as equation 1, with x interpreted di¤erently in each case.
Gamma discounting stems from using the average expert discount factor to determine the
certainty equivalent social discount rate. Yet the link between equation 1 and expected social
welfare optimization is not immediately clear. As a consequence, it does not obviously follow
that this approach is superior to using either the mean or median of x, the Expected Net
Future Value criterion of Gollier (2009), or some other aggregation method or social choice
criterion: In addition, recent evidence by Drupp et al. (2015) shows that such expert opinions
on the SDR contain a mix of subjective normative judgements on matters of ethics, and
positivist forecasts of veriable quantities such as future interest rates or growth. As shown
by Freeman and Groom (2015), and discussed below, the theory that lies behind aggregating
these two types of opinion are very di¤erent. Nevertheless, theoretical justications do
exist for the aggregation of expert opinions using equation 1, although these are not entirely
general and the assumptions are often restrictive.
3.1 Aggregating normative expert opinions
First consider the situation in which di¤erences in expert opinion reect heterogeneous values
of the normative parameters of the Ramsey rule and associated SRTP: xi = i + ig. In
this case, equation 1 generally emerges from frameworks where all experts have identical
time separable and stationary logarithmic preferences (i = 1 for all i) and beliefs about
future consumption growth, g. Where experts di¤er is in their preferred pure rates of time
preference, i.
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In this context Jouini et al. (2010) and Jouini and Napp (2014) imagine heterogeneous
agents each with individual endowments wi. They assume that these agents are experts and
show that if these experts were committed to trade inter-temporally within such an economy
on the basis of these preferences and endowments, the equilibrium consumption path would
be characterized by a social discount rate of the following form:
RJMNH =  
1
H
ln
"
NX
i=1
wiiPn
j=1wjj
exp ( Hxi)
#
(6)
This aggregation of agents preferences and beliefs has a similar form to equation 2, and
equation 3 emerges when wii = 1=N for all agents and the sample frequency of opinions is
gamma distributed.
While equation 6 reects the equilibrium social discount rate, Heal and Millner (2014)
consider instead the social optimal in an economy with heterogeneous agents each with their
own pure time preference, i, and Pareto weight wi. A representative agent is sought
that would choose the social optimal and in some sense reconcile the disagreement on i.
Assuming again that each agent has logarithmic preferences (i = 1 for all i), the social
optimal can be implemented by a representative agent whose pure rate of time preference
for aggregate utility for the time horizon H is given by:16
H =  
1
H
ln
"
NX
i=1
wi exp ( iH)
#
(7)
with associated social Ramsey rule, xH = 

H + g. The price of a claim on $1 at time H, pH
16This equation di¤ers from the one in Heal and Millner (2014) because they give instantaneous (forward)
discount rates, while H here represents the (spot) discount rate between time zero and H. We use spot
rates to be consistent with the rest of this paper. Further details of this distinction are available on request
from the authors.
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is therefore given by:
pH = exp ( HxH) = exp ( HH) exp ( Hg)
=
NX
i=1
wi exp ( iH) exp ( Hg) (8)
=
NX
i=1
wi exp ( xiH)
This has the same functional form as equation 2 and yields equation 3 when wi = 1=N for
all i.
3.2 Aggregating positivist expert opinion
Alternatively, the responses xi might reect di¤erent expert forecasts of a positive return to
capital over the horizon of the cash ow. Dene ptH to be the price at time t of a claim on
$1 at time H (so that p0H = pH and pHH = 1), and xtH as the per-period discount rate:
pt 1H = Et 1 [ptH ] exp ( xtH) (9)
Then by repeated iteration of this single-period present value equation (see, for example Ang
and Liu (2004)):
p0H = E0 [p1H ] exp ( x0H)
= E0 [E1 [p2H exp ( x1H) exp ( x0H)]] (10)
= ::: = E0 [exp( HxH)]
where xH = H 1
XH 1
t=0
xtH is the average single-period expected rate of return to the claim
over the horizon of the project. This has the same functional form as equation 1. For
the purposes of this paper, we refer to equation 10 as the Expected Net Present Value
condition, followingWeitzman (1998). More detailed theoretical discussions of the derivation
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of this approach have been given in Traeger (2013), Gollier and Weitzman (2010), Freeman
(2010) and Gollier (2009).
Freeman and Groom (2015) consider the situation when the response of each expert, xi
is their own personal forecast of xH : xi = Ei [xH ]. In this case, the social planner can
aggregate the individual expectations and produce a signicantly more accurate assessment
of the true value of xH than any of the individual experts. If individual forecast errors
are identically and independently normally distributed, then it is the standard error of the
distribution of responses that is the appropriate measure of remaining uncertainty, not the
standard deviation. As a consequence, the social planners pdf, f (x), is much more heavily
centered around the mean value than the sample frequency distribution of responses, ef-
fectively placing less weight on the individuals who have outlying opinions. This positivist
interpretation of expert judgements therefore does not lead to the equal weighting of discount
factors that underlies the gamma discounting approach that is represented by equation 3,
and the resulting term structures of discount rates only decline slowly with the time horizon.
3.3 The econometric ENPV approach
Rather than seeking opinions, the pdf of xH in equation 10 can instead be estimated using
an econometric approach. In order to do this it is necessary to associate xtH with the return
on a specic nancial asset. The standard choice is to set xtH = rft, the yield on a risk-free
Treasury bond. Yet this choice is, in itself, controversial and only follows under certain
restrictive assumptions. This is because, even though the nal payo¤ is known to be $1,
the interim price of the claim on this cash ow, ptH for t 2 [1; H   1] is unknown in the
previous period. Therefore the one period discount rate, xtH , will, in general, incorporate a
risk premium reecting this uncertainty over ptH . Applying a single period risk-free rate is
only appropriate under conditions that endogenize a zero risk premium. Most notably Cox
et al. (1981) argue that locally certainty in consumption (ct+1 being perfectly known at
time t) justies this choice. Gollier (2014), in particular, has argued that this assumption
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is highly unrealistic.
Despite its theoretical limitations, the econometric ENPV approach has been employed
in a number of highly-cited studies on long-term discount rates; see, for example, Newell
and Pizer (2003), Groom et al. (2007), Gollier et al. (2008), Hepburn et al. (2009), and
Freeman et al. (2015). These, in turn, have been highly inuential in shaping international
governmental policy. We return to this framework in the next section.
3.4 Consumption-based asset pricing
Equation 1 can alternatively be interpreted through consumption-based approaches to social
discount rates. Suppose utility u (ct; t) is gained from consuming ct units of the single
consumption good at time t. From a standard Euler equation, if a project makes a future
payment of $1 at time H and nothing at any other time, then its present value is given by:
pH =
E [u0(cH ; H)]
E [u0 (c0; 0)]
(11)
Proposition 1 describes how equation 1 can be generalized to the consumption-based ap-
proach.
Proposition 1: Assuming current consumption, c0, is non-stochastic and that there is
a time-separable power utility function of the form, u0(cH ; H) = e Hc
 
H , with pure time
preference rate  and coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ; then:
pH = E [exp ( HxH)] (12)
xH = +

H
ln (cH=c0)
and this also takes the same functional form as equation 1.
Proof: See Appendix B
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In summary, there are a number of di¤erent theoretical justications for equation 1, and
while each requires that x is interpreted in di¤erent ways, the essential mathematical struc-
ture remains the same. Showing that this structure has a range of theoretical interpretations
gives our results broader relevance and the potential for more applications. Much, but not
all, of the remaining theoretical contention reects either (i) the choice to weight all discount
factors equally when deriving equation 3, and this explains why these weights were the focus
of our attention in the previous section, or (ii) associating xtH with a yield on a risk-free
Treasury bond.
4 Other sharp bounds term structures
In this section, we take the econometric ENPV and consumption-based asset pricing ap-
proaches to equation 1, which have both been inuential in policy circles, and create sharp
bounds for the certainty-equivalent social discount rate in each case.
4.1 The econometric ENPV approach
We follow the state-space model of Groom et al. (2007) within the econometric ENPV
approach. Let ft = ln (100rft), and assume that this evolves according to:
ft =  + tft 1 + et (13)
t = 1t 1 + ut
which is an AR(1) process with time-varying autoregressive parameter, t. The error terms
are independently and identically normally distributed (i.i.n.d.) with variance 2e and 
2
u
respectively and zero means. Parameter calibrations are taken directly from Groom et al.
(2007), and the properties of fH (xH), which are now H dependent, are then determined by
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simulation.17
The top graph in Figure 3 presents values of RH under this econometric ENPV interpre-
tation of equation 1, with the solid line being directly comparable against Figure 3 in Groom
et al. (2007). The graph also presents sharp upper and lower bounds for RH when there is
agreement on the upper and lower supports of fH (xH) as well as the rst K moments, once
more determined using the technique in Karlin and Studden (1966). Again it is clear that,
for long time horizons, RH can potentially lie within a wide range, although the bounds are
not as spread as in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
Panel A of Table 3 mimics Panels AC of Table 2 when xH is interpreted within the
framework of Groom et al. (2007). It reports the SCC and the present values of HS2 and
nuclear decommissioning under the baseline model, and the sharp upper and lower bounds
of RH for di¤erent moments (K) and quantiles (Q).
[Insert Table 3 around here]
The ranges of possible values are narrower now than in Table 2 because the upper and
lower bounds for RH are tighter in Figure 3 than Figure 1. For decision making purposes,
there is still considerable uncertainty over the SCC; ranging from $16.2/tC to $22.6/tC when
K = 3 and $14.8/tC to $20.4/tC when Q = 7.
4.2 Consumption-based asset pricing
To derive declining discount rates in the consumption-based asset pricing setting, suppose
ln (ct=ct 1) =  + "t; where "t  N (0; 2), but that the value of  is unknown. This
17The parameter estimates (with associated standard errors) are rf0 = 4%,  = 0:510 (0:0082); 1 = 0:990
(0:002), ln(2e) =  9:158 (1:324), ln
 
2u

=  6:730 (0:144). Further details of the simulation process are
available on request from the authors. Unreported results are also available for a parameterization of the
econometric ENPV model that is based on a calibration reported in Newell and Pizer (2003). Again, our
central conclusion holds in this case.
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approach is used as a justication for the French governments position on long-term social
discounting, although the arguments are based on a simple numerical example rather than
an empirical analysis; see (Lebegue 2005, p.102).18 To calibrate this model we follow Gollier
(2012), and assume  takes one of two values, u = 3% or l = 1% with equal probability,
making fH (xH) a mixture normal distribution with properties that depend on H.
In the bottom graph of Figure 3, we again present RH under the baseline model, which
can be compared against Figure 6.2 of Gollier (2012), as well as upper and lower bounds
of RH contingent on agreement over the support and rst K moments of fH (xH).19 When
K = 4, the bounds in this case are quite tight at all horizons, but are then much more widely
spread for lower values of K.
Panel B of Table 3 gives the present values under this model. Generally, except forK = 4,
the potential range of values is more dispersed than under the econometric ENPV model
reported in Panel A, but narrower than for the gamma discounting calibrations reported
in Table 2. Strong agreement on the moments continues to give a more precise valuation
than when consensus is over the quantiles. But in all cases, it is not possible to precisely
determine the SCC.
5 Conclusion
There are a number of theoretical and empirical arguments for using a declining term struc-
ture of social discount rates for intergenerational projects. These largely stem from incor-
porating uncertainty in future consumption growth or interest rates into the analysis, or
dealing with disagreement between experts on the discount rate. So persuasive have these
18It is well known that DDRs require persistence in the growth di¤usion process in this setting. If,
alternatively, growth is independently and identically distributed the term structure will be at. See, for
example, (Gollier 2012, Ch 3).
19This graph is based on parameter values  = 0,  = 2 and  = 3:6%. Further details of the calculations
are available on request for the authors. Unreported results are also available for the sharp upper and lower
bounds of RH in the Markov regime switching models which underlie Figures 5.2 and 5.3 in Gollier (2012)
in this consumption based asset pricing setting framework. Again, the main conclusions of this paper hold
within this setting.
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arguments been that they are now recognized in government policies and recommendations
in the UK, France, Norway and Denmark. The practical question that necessarily follows
is: how can the theory be operationalized?
So far policy makers have sought a range of expert economistsadvice on the best route
forward, and the experts have provided them with empirical estimates of the certainty-
equivalent term structure of social discount rates based on specic theories and characteri-
zations of the future (e.g. Gollier (2012), Arrow et al. (2014)). The fact of the matter is,
though, that we know far less about what lies ahead than the complete characterizations of
risk that many of these models suggest. This raises the question, how certain are we about
the certainty-equivalent social discount rate?
This paper shows that, even if there are strongly overlapping views on the primitives of
social discounting, the empirical term structure of the certainty-equivalent social discount
rate emerging from many theoretical models cannot be positioned within anything but very
wide bounds. This is particularly true for long time horizons. The obvious implication of this
is that policy prescriptions become less crisp for all but the highest (or lowest) return public
projects. For instance, viable estimates for the social cost of carbon and the net present
values of other intergenerational project become alarmingly dispersed from this position
of ignorance. Apparently trivial disagreements over parameterization choices can lead to
signicant di¤erences in policy recommendations.
While not quite a dismal theorem, overall this paper presents a depressing nding for
practitioners of cost-benet analysis. Even if we are willing to put issues of Knightian
uncertainty to one side, we must accept that we know little about the true nature of what
the distant future might hold. This admission of ignorance means that estimated present
values are likely to be so imprecise as to provide only minimal guidance to policy makers
on intergenerational projects. One positive outcome of the paper is the formal mechanism
for determining the range over which sensitivity analysis might be undertaken when doubt
exists over the appropriate choice of discount rate. However, the broader message is that
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we may have to look towards additional decision-making criteria, beyond the mechanical
calculation of Net Present Values, to shed more light on the social value of intergenerational
projects.
Appendix A: Generating the sharp bounds
In this appendix, we describe in more detail the method that we use for determining the
upper and lower bounds of RH when there is agreement on the supports and moments of
fH (xH). The H subscripts in this appendix reect the fact that xH may be horizon
dependent in some interpretations of equation 1, although not gamma discounting.
Consider the set of all well-dened probability density functions, =H , with elements gH ,
which are supported on a common interval [aH ; bH ].20 We assume that there is consensus
that the truefH (xH) is an element of this set, but we do not know which element it is.
Next we suppose that we only know the rst K (non-central) moments of fH (xH);
Ef

xkH

= MkH for k  K where Ef [] is the expectation operator conditional on the
pdf of xH being fH . The smaller is K, the more ignorant we are about fH (xH) ; but claim-
ing any knowledge of the moments of the pdf allows us to narrow our search to the subset
=KH  =H that contains all elements gH with rst K moments Eg

xkH

= MkH for k  K.
We then dene strict upper and lower bounds for RH ; RuH and RlH ; by:
RuH =   1
H
ln (inf [Eg [exp( HxH)] jgH 2 =KH ]) (14)
RlH =   1
H
ln (sup [Eg [exp( HxH)] jgH 2 =KH ])
As expressions of the form E [exp ( HxH)] are moment generating functions (mgf), or
Laplace-Stieltjes transformations, we can invoke a powerful result from Karlin and Stud-
den (1966) to nd RuH and RlH . These are derived by establishing two separate, discrete
20There is a restriction that aH is nite. For all the examples we consider we also take nite bH , but the
extension to innite bH is straightforward given the results in Eckberg (1977).
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pdfs which are, loosely speaking, at opposite endsof the support and yet share the rst K
moments. The upper bound for the mgf is found by calculating the most extreme discrete
distribution to place as much mass as possible in the left hand tail (lower values of the dis-
count rate), while still satisfying the K moment conditions. The lower bound is found by
minimizing the mass in the left hand tail.
More concretely, the extreme discrete distributions place non-zero probability mass at
$ points on the interval [aH ; bH ] where the number of mass points depends on the number
of moments, K, of the distribution of xH that we are willing to assume we agree upon:
$ 2 [(K + 1)=2, (K + 3) =2]. We denote these points by VqlH (vqlH) for the lower bound
of the mgf and VquH (vquH) for the upper bound when aH = 0 (aH 6= 0), with associated
probabilities qlH and quH , where q indexes the mass points from smaller to larger values
of xH .
A.1 aH = 0
First, consider the restricted case when aH = 0 and bH = BH ; we broaden the dis-
cussion to more general values of aH and bH in the next subsection. The method of
Karlin and Studden (1966) now follows from the observation that the set of functionsn
1; xH ; :::; x
K
H ; ( 1)K+1 exp ( HxH)
o
for H > 0 and positive integer K is a Tchebyche¤
system. This allows us to identify the properties of the discrete distributions that give
sharp bounds for the mgf (see, for example, Eckberg (1977)):
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VqlH VquH
K even
$ = (K + 2) =2
K=2 points in (0; BH)
One point at BH
$ = (K + 2) =2
K=2 points in (0; BH)
One point at 0
K odd
$ = (K + 1) =2
(K + 1) =2 points in (0; BH)
$ = (K + 3) =2
(K   1) =2 points in (0; BH)
One point at 0
One point at BH
Each extreme discrete distribution is uniquely identied since the number of degrees of
freedom equals the number of moment constraints. For example, for even K; there are K=2
degrees of freedom on location and (K + 2) =2   1 degrees of freedom for the probabilities,
giving a total number of degrees of freedom of K. It is also straightforward to verify that
there are K degrees of freedom in parameter choice when K is odd. Therefore the extreme
density functions are uniquely dened by the K moment conditions in all cases.
Closed form solutions for VqlH , VquH , qlH and quH are available for K  3. When
K = 1, the lower bound has only one mass point which is on the mean value; V1lH = M1H .
The upper bound has mass at V1uH = 0 and V2uH = BH only and the probability 1uH is set
to ensure that the mean is equal toM1H ; 1uH = (BH  M1H) = BH . Closed form solutions
for K = 2 and K = 3 are given in Eckberg (1977). For the case K = 2:
q = 1 q = 2 q = 1 q = 2
VqlH
M1HBH  M2H
BH  M1H BH VquH 0
M2H
M1H
qlH 1 1  1 quH M2H  M
2
1H
M2H
M21H
M2H
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where 1 = (BH  M1H)2 =
 
M2H  M21H + (BH  M1H)2

. For K = 3:
q = 1 q = 2 q = 1 q = 2 q = 3
VqlH
A1   
2
A1 + 
2
VquH 0  BH
qlH
+ A1   2M1H
2
  A1 + 2M1H
2
quH 1  1   2 1 2
where:
A1 =
M3H  M1HM2H
M2H  M21H
A2 =
M22H  M1HM3H
M2H  M21H
;  =
q
A21 + 4A2
2 =
M1HM3H  M22H
M1HB3H   2M2HB2H +M3HBH
; 1 =
(M1H   2BH)2
M2H   2B2H
;  =
M2H   2B2H
M1H   2BH
As noted by (Johnson and Taa¤e 1993, p.96), less analytically tractable cases (e.g., four
or ve non-central moments) call for use of symbolic or numerical methods for solving the
nonlinear equations. We use numerical methods here.21
A.2 aH 6= 0
When fH (xH) is supported on the interval [aH ; bH ] for aH 6= 0, we rst undertake a change
of variables. Dene yH = xH aH ; gH (yH) = gH (xH) and =KH as the set containing all ele-
ments gH (yH). The lower bounds for RH are derived from the bounds for Eg [exp ( HyH)].
RlH =   1
H
ln (exp ( HaH) sup [Eg [exp( HyH)] jgH 2 =KH ])
and there is an analogous expression for RuH ; with the supremum replaced by the inmum.
21Details available on request from the authors.
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Equation 11 states that the price, pH , of a payo¤ of $1 at time H is given by:
pH =
E[u0(cH ; H)]
u0(c0; 0)
assuming c0 is non-stochastic. With the utility function dened by u0(cH ; H) = e Hc
 
H :
pH = E
"
e H

cH
c0
 #
Using o¤setting exponential and logarithm functions, the fact that  ln (z) = ln (z) ; and
then factoring out H yields:
pH = E

e H exp

  ln

cH
c0

= E

exp

 H    ln

cH
c0

= E

exp

 H

+

H
ln

cH
c0

(15)
Then pH can be written as pH = E [exp ( HxH)] where xH = + H ln

cH
c0

; which can be
interpreted as the Social Rate of Time Preference for an annualized growth rate given by
H 1 ln

cH
c0

: This is equation 12. QED.
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Figure 1. This gure presents the term structure of social discount rates as given through
the gamma discounting schedule of Weitzman (2001). The solid line is the baseline param-
eterization from this model. We then present upper and lower bounds for RH conditional
on matching the rst K moments of the distribution for K 2 [1; 4] in the top graph, and
Q quantiles of the distribution, for Q 2 f3; 5; 7g in the bottom graph. The support of the
probability density function in each case is [0%; 19:11%].
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Figure 2. The top graph presents the cumulative distribution function (cdf) for the raw
sample frequency distribution of Weitzmans gamma discounting survey data. It also shows
cdfs of gamma distributions tted to this data using method of moments (MM) and maximum
likelihood (MLE) techniques, as well as the cdf of a Wald (Inverse Gaussian) distribution
tted by a method of moments approach to the same data. The bottom graph gives the
schedule of discount rates for each of these distributions.
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Figure 3. The top graph presents the term structure of social discount rates as given through
the ENPV setting by the state-space model of Groom et al. (2007), while the bottom graph is
derived from the parameter uncertainty model for logarithmic consumption growth described
by Gollier (2012). The solid lines are the baseline parameterization from the models, which
can be compared against Figure 3 in Groom et al. (2007) and Figure 6.2 of Gollier (2012).
The graphs also present upper and lower bounds for RH conditional on matching the rst
K moments of the underlying distribution.
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H = 100 years H = 200 years H = 400 years
Min Max Min Max Min Max
Panel A: Gamma Method of Moments
Baseline Model 114,778 42,782 13,839
Panel B: Moments
K=1 17,752 789,125 315 789,125 0.10 789,125
K=2 30,128 345,754 942 344,356 0.92 344,353
K=3 62,556 261,809 4,930 257,593 30.6 257,569
K=4 83,094 188,953 10,311 176,622 159.4 176,410
Panel C: Quantiles
Q=3 35,117 368,450 3,067 336,400 27.6 333,361
Q=5 61,643 218,117 15,104 133,267 1,696 103,939
Q=7 65,672 196,761 19,627 95,628 4,913 44,402
Panel D: Distributional Family
Gamma MLE 89,360 26,489 6,290
Wald 86,130 19,168 2,114
Sample frequency 117,736 255,955 76,778,160
Table 1. The present value of $1m at horizons of 100, 200 and 400 years under di¤erent
discounting schedules.
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SCC HS2 NDA
Min Max Min Max Min Max
Panel A: Gamma Method of Moments
Baseline Model 20.0 23.1 46.8
Panel B: Moments
K=1 5.3 188.9 13.8 66.7 38.9 85.2
K=2 7.2 83.7 16.7 33.2 41.7 55.2
K=3 11.1 63.8 20.7 28.3 44.8 51.2
K=4 13.6 46.1 22.1 25.0 45.9 48.6
Panel C: Quantiles
Q=3 6.7 86.5 13.0 41.1 33.4 64.6
Q=5 10.8 43.1 16.1 32.6 38.5 56.4
Q=7 11.7 35.2 16.4 31.6 39.1 55.5
Panel D: Distributional Family
Gamma MLE 15.6 21.0 45.0
Wald 14.6 21.5 45.4
Sample frequency 979.8 22.9 46.9
Table 2. The present values, as calculated through the di¤erent discounting schedules
presented in Figures 1 and 2, of (i) the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) in terms of dollars per
ton of carbon ($/tC), (ii) the costs of Phase 1 of the High Speed 2 (HS2) rail line in the UK;
London to Birmingham (£ bn), (iii) the costs of decommissioning the previous generation of
nuclear power stations in the UK (£ bn).
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SCC HS2 NDA
Min Max Min Max Min Max
Panel A: ENPV
K=1 14.8 39.8 25.5 42.3 50.7 64.8
K=2 15.4 25.8 25.8 29.9 51.0 54.1
K=3 16.2 22.6 26.3 28.3 51.4 52.9
K=4 16.6 19.9 26.7 27.6 51.6 52.3
Q=3 11.9 25.9 18.6 33.3 41.4 57.8
Q=5 14.6 21.5 23.3 30.3 47.7 55.0
Q=7 14.8 20.4 24.1 29.7 49.1 54.4
Model 17.5 27.0 51.9
Panel B: Parameter Uncertainty
K=1 5.4 89.2 13.9 74.1 39.1 94.1
K=2 8.6 38.9 18.0 31.3 42.9 53.8
K=3 12.9 27.3 21.3 25.4 45.5 49.0
K=4 13.6 16.5 21.7 22.3 45.9 46.4
Q=3 6.5 65.6 12.2 60.3 33.2 85.5
Q=5 8.7 32.5 15.0 37.2 37.6 62.2
Q=7 9.2 24.0 15.5 31.9 38.3 57.1
Model 14.4 21.9 46.1
Table 3. As Table 2, but with bounds now based on the ENPV model of Groom et al.
(2007) and the parameter uncertainty model for logarithmic consumption growth described
by Gollier (2012). The terms structures used are presented in Figure 3.
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